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Abstract
In a world where rational individuals may hold di↵erent prior beliefs, a sender can
influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a signal. We
characterize the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by a signal,
and provide necessary and su cient conditions for a sender to benefit from information
control. We examine a class of models with no value of information control under
common priors, and show that a sender generically benefits from information control
under heterogeneous priors. We extend our analysis to cases where the receiver’s prior
is unknown to the sender.
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1 Introduction
A notable feature of organizations is that those with decision making power are lobbied. In
many cases, individuals influence decision makers by changing the information available to
them. For instance, individuals can acquire and communicate hard evidence, or signal soft
information. Another way of influencing decision makers’ learning is by directly specifying
the informativeness of the signals that they observe, that is, by engaging in information
control (as in e.g. Brocas and Carrillo 2007 and Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011).
Information control is pervasive in economics and politics. A pharmaceutical company
chooses which initial animal tests to perform, and the results influence the Food and Drug
Administration’s decision to approve further human testing. A central bank shapes the in-
formativeness of a market index observed by households (such as inflation) by determining
which information is collected and how to compute the index. A news channel selects the
questions asked by the host of an electoral debate, and the answers a↵ect voters’ opinions
about the candidates. In all these cases, changing the signal (e.g., changing the test, the
rules to generate the index, or the questions asked) changes what decision makers can learn.
One rationale for an individual to engage in information control is the presence of con-
flicting interests, as designing what decision makers learn can sway the latter’s choices to
decisions favored by the former. Another important rationale, on which we focus in this
paper, arises when individuals and decision makers disagree in their views of the world.1 We
ask: how does open disagreement a↵ect an individual’s benefit from persuading others, and
her choice of an optimal signal?
The next example, where a novel political issue must be addressed by a policy maker,
illustrates our main insights. As Callander (2011) points out, a large part of the di culty in
policy making is that the policy maker may be uncertain about which policies produce which
outcomes, and much political disagreement is over beliefs about this mapping. This was
certainly true in the late 19th century, when a fast succession of technological breakthroughs
1Many papers study the role of heterogeneous priors in economics and politics. Giat et al. (2010) use data
on pharmaceutical projects to study R&D under heterogeneous priors; Patton and Timmermann (2010) find
empirical evidence that heterogeneity in prior beliefs is an important factor explaining the cross-sectional
dispersion in forecasts of GDP growth and inflation; Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) study the e↵ects of prior
beliefs on media bias.
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created the electric power industry. Politicians had to decide how to regulate safety in this
nascent industry, at a time when there was an increasing number of fatal electrocutions and
significant disagreement over the dangers of electricity, even among members of the scientific
community (for instance, much of the safety concerns were over voltage, instead of the more
important amperage).
For concreteness, consider a policy maker (mayor) who must choose which policy a 2 [0, 1]
to implement, where a lower a represents a liberal rule for the transmission of electricity,
and a higher a represents strict restrictions, such as establishing a maximum voltage.2 Let
the uncertainty regarding the optimal regulation be captured by an unknown state of the
world ✓ 2 {0, 0.5, 1}, so that the mayor’s payo↵ is uR(a, ✓) =  (a   ✓)2. A politically
biased media outlet has a payo↵ increasing in the regulation level, uS(a, ✓) = a. The media
outlet (sender) has no private information, but can influence the mayor’s (receiver) decision
through an investigative report.3 After observing the report’s finding, the mayor updates
his expectation over the state and chooses policy a⇤ = ER[✓]. Therefore, the media chooses
a signal that maximizes its ex ante expectation of the mayor’s ex post expectation of ✓.
If the media and the mayor share a common prior belief, then the media doesn’t benefit
from information control as the policy a is linear in the expected ✓. This would not be the
case if there is belief disagreement. Suppose that the priors over ✓ 2 {0, 0.5, 1} are pR =
(0.4, 0.5, 0.1) for the mayor and pS = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) for the media, so that ER[✓] = 0.35 < ES[✓] =
0.5. That is, from the media’s perspective the mayor is “skeptical” about the need for regula-
tion. Clearly, information control is valuable in this case: by designing a “perfect” signal that
fully reveals the state the media can increase the mayor’s expectation (and consequently his
policy choice) from 0.35 to, on average, its own expectation 0.5. Nevertheless, a fully reveal-
ing signal is not optimal. The media’s optimal signal only determines whether ✓ = 1 or not. If
2Two standards, alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC), were competing to dominate the
market, in what became known as “the war of the currents.” An important comparative advantage of AC
was its capacity to be transmitted over greater distances using higher voltage. Hence, stricter transmission
rules were often championed by DC supporters — for example, the Edison Electric Light Company tried to
influence the New York Board of Electrical Control to impose strict voltage limits in the city.
3The media can generate a report (signal) that is correlated with ✓. The media can change the informa-
tiveness of its signal by changing, for example, its editorial board and the reporters assigned to cover the
story. In Duggan and Martinelli (2011), a biased media outlet chooses the “slant” of its report.
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the report reveals ✓ = 1, then players share a common posterior. However, if the report shows
that ✓ 6= 1, then the mayor’s expectation becomes 0.4⇥0+0.5⇥0.50.4+0.5 = 518 , strictly higher than the
media’s expectation (1/3)⇥0+(1/3)⇥0.51/3+1/3 = 0.25. With this signal the media converts the “skepti-
cal” mayor into a “believer”, and expects the average policy to increase to 23⇥ 518+ 13⇥1 = 1427 .
While it seems natural that the media benefits from providing information to a skeptic,
it is less clear whether the same is true when the mayor is a believer. Suppose now that the
mayor’s prior over states is pR = (0.1, 0.5, 0.4), while the media has the same prior as before,
so that ES[✓] = 0.5 < ER[✓] = 0.65. Clearly, a signal that fully reveals the state does not
benefit the media, as it expects the mayor’s expectation of ✓ to decrease on average. Perhaps
surprisingly, the media can still benefit from designing the signal. The optimal signal only
determines whether ✓ = 0.5 or not. The mayor’s expectation decreases to 0.5 when the
report reveals ✓ = 0.5, and increases to 0.1⇥0+0.4⇥10.1+0.4 = 0.8 when the report shows that ✓ 6= 0.5.
With this signal the media expects the average policy to increase to 23 ⇥ 0.8 + 13 ⇥ 0.5 = 0.7.
This is possible because, in spite of the mayor being a believer, the media assigns more
probability (2/3) than the mayor (1/2) to the “beneficial” signal {✓ 6= 0.5}.
The previous example highlights two important points. First, while the common prior
assumption may be appropriate for established policy issues with a long historical record
of policy experimentation, technological breakthroughs and rapid social changes may create
novel policy issues, with a potentially substantial initial belief disagreement. Second, open
disagreement provides a separate rationale for information control — in the example, there
is no value of information control when players share a common prior. In fact, Section 4
shows that in a more general class of models: (i) prior belief disagreement generically4 leads
the sender to benefit from information control, and (ii) full information disclosure is often
suboptimal, independently of whether the receiver is a skeptic or a believer.
Motivated by this example, we consider a general model in which a sender can influence
a receiver’s behavior by designing his informational environment. After observing the real-
ization of a signal, the receiver applies Bayes’ rule to update his belief, and chooses an action
accordingly. The sender has no private information and can influence this action by designing
what the receiver can learn from the signal, i.e. by specifying the statistical relation of the
4Genericity is interpreted over the space of pairs of prior beliefs.
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signal to the underlying state. We make three assumptions regarding how Bayesian players
process information. First, it is common knowledge that players hold di↵erent prior beliefs
about the state, i.e. they “agree to disagree”. Second, this disagreement is non-dogmatic:
each player initially assigns a positive probability to each possible state of the world. Third,
the signal chosen by the sender is “commonly understood,” in the sense that if players knew
the actual realization of the state, then they would agree on the likelihood of observing each
possible signal realization.
We start our analysis by asking: from the sender’s perspective, what is the set of distri-
butions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by a signal? When players share a common
prior, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) (KG henceforth) establish that this set is defined by
two properties: (i) posteriors must be homogeneous and (ii) the expected posterior must
equal the prior. Now consider heterogeneous priors. Clearly, posteriors do not need to be
homogeneous and, from the point of view of the sender, the receiver’s expected posterior
does not need to equal either prior (as in the previous example). Our first contribution is to
show that, given priors pS and pR, posteriors qS and qR form a bijection — qR is derived from
qS through a perspective transformation. Moreover, this transformation is independent of
the actual signal. Consequently, given prior beliefs, the probability distribution of posterior
beliefs of only one player su ces to derive the joint probability distribution of posteriors
generated by an arbitrary signal. This result allows us to characterize the set of distributions
of posteriors that can be induced by a signal (Proposition 1). Importantly, our results imply
that belief disagreement does not expand this set, that is, it does not allow the sender to
generate “more” distributions of posterior beliefs.
We solve for the sender’s optimal signal (Proposition 2) and provide a simple geometric
condition that is both necessary and su cient for a sender to benefit from designing the
signal (Corollary 1). We also obtain a necessary and su cient condition for a sender to
benefit from garbling a fully informative signal (Corollary 2).
In Section 4 we study pure-persuasion, i.e., models where the sender’s utility is not a
function of the state. KG show that when players share a common prior, information con-
trol is valuable when the sender can exploit the non-concavity of the receiver’s action in
his beliefs, or the convexity of the sender’s utility function in the receiver’s actions. We
show that even in the absence of these features, the sender can still benefit from information
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control by exploiting di↵erences in players’ prior beliefs. In fact, if the receiver’s action is
the expectation of a random variable and the state space has three or more distinct states,
then a sender generically benefits from information control (Proposition 5), regardless of
the curvature of the sender’s utility. While the sender cannot induce “more” distributions
over posterior beliefs, she can nevertheless benefit from a signal for which she puts more
probability than the receiver on signal realizations that increase the receiver’s expectation
(and thus his action). Such signals exist for a generic pair of players’ prior beliefs.
Our paper is primarily related to two strands in the literature.
Information Control: Some recent papers study the gains to players from controlling the
information that reaches decision makers. In Brocas and Carrillo (2007), a leader without
private information sways the decision of a follower in her favor by deciding the timing at
which a decision must be made. As information arrives sequentially, choosing the timing of
the decision is equivalent to shaping (in a particular way) the information available to the
follower. Duggan and Martinelli (2011) consider one media outlet that can a↵ect electoral
outcomes by choosing the “slant” of its news reports. Gill and Sgroi (2008, 2012) consider
a privately-informed principal who can subject herself to a test designed to provide public
information about her type, and can optimally choose the test’s di culty. Rayo and Segal
(2010) study optimal advertising when a company can design how to reveal the attributes of
its product, but it cannot distort this information. In a somewhat di↵erent setting, Ivanov
(2010) studies the benefit to a principal of limiting the information available to a privately
informed agent when they both engage in strategic communication (i.e. cheap talk). The
paper most closely related to ours is KG. They analyze the problem of a sender who wants
to persuade a receiver to change his action for an arbitrary state space and action space,
and arbitrary, but common, prior beliefs, and arbitrary state-dependent preferences for both
the sender and the receiver. We contribute to this literature by introducing and analyzing a
new motive for information control: belief disagreement over an unknown state of the world.
Heterogeneous Priors and Persuasion: Several papers in economics, finance and poli-
tics have explored the implications of heterogeneous priors on equilibrium behavior and the
performance of di↵erent economic institutions. In particular, Van den Steen (2004, 2009,
2010a, 2011) and Che and Kartik (2009) show that heterogeneous priors increase the incen-
tives of agents to acquire information, as each agent believes that new evidence will back
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their “point of view” and thus “persuade” others. Our work complements this view by
showing that persuasion may be valuable even when others hold “beneficial” beliefs from the
sender’s perspective. We also di↵er from this work in that we consider situations in which
the sender has more leeway in shaping the signals that reach decision makers.
We present the model’s general setup in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes the value of
information control. In Section 4 we examine pure persuasion models. Section 5 extends the
model to the case of private priors. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendices.
2 The Model
Our model features a game between a sender (she) and a receiver (he). The sender has no
authority over the receiver’s actions, yet she can influence them through the design of a sig-
nal observed by the receiver. This setup can be regarded as a model of influence, a model of
persuasion, or a model of managed learning where a sender “sways” a receiver into changing
his action by carefully designing what he can learn. Our main departure from the previous
literature on information control, particularly Brocas and Carrillo (2007) and Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011), is that we allow players to openly disagree about the uncertainty they face.
Preferences and Prior Beliefs: All players are expected utility maximizers. The receiver
selects an action a from a compact set A. While in some applications it may be natural for
the sender to also a↵ect the outcome of the game directly by choosing an action, we abstract
from this possibility in this paper. The sender and the receiver have preferences over actions
a 2 A characterized by continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions uS(a, ✓) and
uR(a, ✓), with ✓ 2 ⇥ and ⇥ a finite state space, common to both players.
Both players are initially uncertain about the realization of the state ✓. A key aspect
of our model is that players openly disagree about the likelihood of ✓. Following Aumann
(1976), this implies that rational players must then hold di↵erent prior beliefs.5 Thus let the
receiver’s prior be pR = {pR✓ }✓2⇥ and the sender’s prior be pS = {pS✓ }✓2⇥. We assume that
pR and pS belong to the interior of the simplex   (⇥), that is, players have prior beliefs that
5See Morris (1994, 1995) and Van den Steen (2010b, 2011) for an analysis of the sources of heterogeneous
priors and extended discussions of its role in economic theory.
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are “totally mixed” as they have full support.6 This assumption will avoid known issues of
non-convergence of posterior beliefs when belief distributions fail to be absolutely continuous
with respect to each other (see Blackwell and Dubins 1962, and Kalai and Lehrer 1994).
In our base model these prior beliefs are common knowledge, i.e. players “agree to
disagree” on their views of ✓. This implies that di↵erences in beliefs stem from di↵erences in
prior beliefs rather than di↵erences in information. We extend the base model in Section 5
to consider cases where players have heterogenous prior beliefs drawn from some distribution
H(pR, pS). In that case, it will not be commonly known by players that they disagree on the
likelihood of ✓.
It is natural to inquire as to the sources of heterogenous prior beliefs and ponder whether
these same sources may a↵ect the way in which players process new information. For in-
stance, mistakes in information processing will eventually lead players to di↵erent posterior
beliefs, but will also call into question Bayesian updating. We take the view that players are
Bayes rational, but may initially openly disagree on the likelihood of the state. Typically,
this disagreement can come from lack of experimental evidence or historical records that
would allow players to otherwise reach a consensus on their prior views. This was the case in
our example in the Introduction where a poor understanding of electrical laws lead to widely
varying views on the dangers of electricity. In fact, as argued in Van den Steen (2011), the
Bayesian model specifies how new information is to be processed but is largely silent on
how priors should be (or are actually) formed. Lacking a rational basis for selecting a prior,
the assumption that, nevertheless, individuals should all agree on one may seem unfounded.
In any case, open disagreement does not necessarily hinder players’ ability to process new
information if heterogenous priors stem from insu cient data.
Signals and Information Control: All players process information according to Bayes rule.
The receiver observes the realization of a signal ⇡, updates his belief, and chooses an action.
The sender can a↵ect the receiver’s actions through the design of ⇡. To be specific, a
signal ⇡ consists of a finite realization space Z and a family of likelihood functions over Z,
{⇡ (·|✓)}✓2⇥, with ⇡ (·|✓) 2  (Z). Note that whether or not the signal realization is observed
6Actually, our results only require that players’ prior beliefs have a common support, which may be a
strict subset of ⇥. Assuming a full support easies the exposition without any loss of generality.
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by the sender does not a↵ect the receiver’s actions.
Key to our analysis is that ⇡ is a “commonly understood signal”: the sender’s choice of
⇡ is observed by the receiver and all players agree on the likelihood functions ⇡ (·|✓) , ✓ 2 ⇥.7
Common agreement over ⇡ generates substantial congruence in our model: all players agree
on how a signal realization is generated given the state.8 To wit, if all players knew the
actual realization of the state, then they would all agree on the likelihood of observing each
z 2 Z for any signal ⇡.
Our setup is closely related to models that study the incentives of agents to a↵ect others’
learning, e.g. through “signal jamming” as in Holmstro¨m’s model of career concerns (Holm-
stro¨m 1999) or through obfuscation as in Ellison and Ellison (2009). In contrast to this
literature, the sender in our model directly shapes the learning of the receiver by designing
an “experiment” whose result is correlated with the underlying state. This interpretation
of our model corresponds to several practical situations. For instance, rating systems and
product certification fit this framework where consumers observe the result of an aggregate
measure of the underlying quality of firms/products. Quality tests provide another example,
as a firm may not know the quality of each single product, but can control the likelihood
that a test detects a defective product. Finally, one can influence the information generated
by a survey or a focus group, by specifying the questionary and the sampling methodology.
We make two important assumptions regarding the set of signals available to the sender.
First, the sender can choose any signal that is correlated with the state. Thus our setup
provides an upper bound on the sender’s benefit from information control in a setting with
a more restricted space of signals. In particular, if the sender faces additional constraints,
she will not engage in designing a signal if there is no value of information control in our
unrestricted setup. Second, signals are costless to the sender. This is not a serious limi-
7Our assumption of a commonly understood signal is similar to the notion of “concordant beliefs” in
Morris (1994). As Morris (1994) indicates, “beliefs are concordant if they agree about everything except
the prior probability of payo↵-relevant states”. Technically, his definition requires both agreement over the
conditional distribution of signals given the state and that each player assigns positive probability to each
signal realization. Our assumptions of a commonly understood signal and totally mixed priors imply that
players’ beliefs are concordant in our setup.
8See Van den Steen (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2006) for models where players also disagree on the
informativeness of signals.
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tation if all signals impose the same cost, and would not a↵ect the choice of signal if the
sender decides to influence the receiver. However, the optimal signal may change if di↵erent
signals impose di↵erent costs. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2013) o↵er an initial exploration of
persuasion with costly signals, where the cost of a signal is given by the expected Shannon
entropy of the beliefs that it induces.
Our focus is on understanding when and how the sender benefits from designing the
signal observed by the receiver. Given a signal ⇡, for a signal realization z that induces
the profile of posterior beliefs (qS(z), qR(z)), the receiver’s choice in any Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium must satisfy
a(qR(z)) 2 argmax
a2A
X
✓2⇥
qR✓ (z)uR(a, ✓),
while the corresponding (subjective) expected utility of the sender after z is realized isX
✓2⇥
qS✓ (z)uS(a(q
R(z)), ✓).
We restrict attention to equilibria in which the receiver’s choice only depends on the
posterior belief induced by the observed signal realization. To this end we define a language-
invariant Perfect Bayesian equilibrium as a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium where for every
signals ⇡ and ⇡0, and signal realizations z and z0 for which qR(z) = qR(z0), the receiver selects
the same action (or the same probability distribution over actions). Our focus on language-
invariant equilibria allows us to abstract from the particular signal realization. Given an
equilibrium a(·), we define the sender’s expected payo↵ v when players hold beliefs (qS, qR) as
v(qS, qR) ⌘
X
✓2⇥
qS✓ uS(a(q
R), ✓), with a(qR) 2 argmax
a2A
X
✓2⇥
qR✓ uR(a, ✓). (1)
We concentrate on equilibria for which the function v is upper-semicontinuous. This class
of equilibria is non-empty: an equilibrium in which whenever the receiver is indi↵erent be-
tween actions he selects an action that maximizes the sender’s expected utility, as a function
of posterior beliefs only, is a (sender-preferred) language-invariant equilibrium for which v is
upper semicontinous.9 Given a language-invariant equilibrium that induces v, the sender’s
9As noted in KG, this follows from Berge’s maximum theorem. Upper-semicontinuity will prove convenient
when establishing the existence of an optimal signal.
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equilibrium expected utility is simply
max
⇡
E⇡S
⇥
v(qS(z), qR(z))
⇤
,
where the maximum is computed over all possible signals ⇡.
Our primary interest in this paper are situations in which if the sender does not influence
the receiver, then the receiver learns nothing about the state. In this case the sender’s
expected utility is simply v(pS, pR). We thus define the value of information control as the
maximum expected gain that can be attained by the sender in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
when in the absence of the sender’s influence the receiver would remain uninformed. Note
that the sender’s maximum expected utility is attained in any sender-preferred equilibrium.
Therefore, defining V (pS, pR) as the expected utility of the sender in a sender-preferred
equilibrium, the value of information control is
V (pS, pR)  v(pS, pR). (2)
Trivially, a sender does not benefit from information control if and only if
V (pS, pR) = v(pS, pR).
Our framework also allows the study of the gains from obfuscating, or otherwise impeding,
the receiver’s learning. To accommodate this case, we simply posit that if the sender does
not engage in information control, then the receiver observes a perfect signal of the state.
Information control then takes the form of garbling — the sender can add noise to the
receiver’s signal in an arbitrary way. This e↵ectively means that the sender can specify the
statistical relation of every signal realization to the underlying state. We define the value
of garbling as the maximum expected gain that can be attained by a sender in a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium when, absent her influence, the receiver learns the state.
Timing: The sender selects a signal ⇡ (= (Z, {⇡ (·|✓)}✓2⇥)) after which the receiver observes
a signal realization z 2 Z, updates his beliefs according to Bayes’ rule, selects an action,
payo↵s are realized and the game ends. As argued before, we concentrate on language-
invariant perfect equilibria for which v is upper semicontinuous.
We have been silent regarding the true distribution governing the realization of ✓. As our
analysis is primarily positive and only considers the behavior of a sender when influencing a
receiver, we remain agnostic as to the true distribution of the state.
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Notational Conventions: For vectors v, w 2 RN , we denote by hv, wi the standard inner
product in RN , i.e. hv, wi = PNi=1 viwi. As ours is a setup with heterogenous priors, this
notation proves convenient when computing expectations where we need to specify both
the information set and the individual whose perspective we are adopting. We also use
a component-wise product of vectors, and denote it by vw, to refer to the vector whose
components are the products of the components of each vector, i.e. (vw)i = viwi. Also, let
cos(v, w) be the cosine of the angle between v and w, i.e. cos(v, w) = hv,wi||v|| ||w|| , and let v||W
be the orthogonal projection of v onto the linear subspace W . Finally, we will often use the
subspace W of “marginal beliefs” defined as
W =
 
" 2 RN : h1, "i = 0 . (3)
This terminology follows from the fact that the di↵erence between any two beliefs must lie
in W .
3 The Value of Information Control under Open Dis-
agreement
When is information control valuable to the sender? Our first contribution is to show that
when players are subjected to a commonly understood signal the posterior belief of one
player can be obtained from the posterior of another player, without explicit knowledge of
the signal choice. This allows us to characterize the (subjective) distributions of posterior
beliefs that can be induced by any signal (Proposition 1). Furthermore, it enables us to
translate the search for an optimal signal to an auxiliary problem where the belief of each
player is expressed in terms of the belief of a reference player, and then apply the techniques
developed in KG to solve this auxiliary problem (Proposition 2). We then provide a simple
necessary and su cient condition for a sender to benefit from supplying information to an
otherwise uninformed receiver (Corollary 1), and a necessary and su cient condition for a
sender to benefit from garbling a fully informative signal (Corollary 2). Finally, we contrast
the gains from information control under open disagreement to the case where players share
a common prior (Proposition 3).
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3.1 Induced Distributions of Posterior Beliefs
From the sender’s perspective, each signal ⇡ induces a (subjective) distribution over profiles
of posterior beliefs. In any language-invariant equilibrium, the receiver’s posterior belief
uniquely determines his action. Therefore, two signals that, conditional on the state, induce
the same distribution over profiles of beliefs generate the same value to the sender. That is,
knowledge of the distribution of posterior beliefs su ces to compute the sender’s expected
utility from ⇡.
If players share a common prior p, then following any realization of ⇡ players will also
share a common posterior q. In this case, KG show that the martingale property of posterior
beliefs E⇡[q] = p is both necessary and su cient to characterize the set of distributions of
beliefs that can be induced on Bayesian rational players by some signal. Consequently, KG
are able to simplify the sender’s problem by directly looking at this set of distributions,
without having to specify the actual signal ⇡ that generates each distribution.
This leads us to ask: when players hold heterogeneous priors, what is the set of joint dis-
tributions of posterior beliefs that are consistent with Bayesian rationality? While it is still
true that from the perspective of each player his expected posterior belief equals his prior, it
is not true that the sender’s expectation over the receiver’s posterior belief always equals the
receiver’s prior. For instance, given any pS 6= pR, a signal ⇡ that is fully informative of the
state implies that from the sender’s perspective E⇡S [q
R] = pS 6= pR. Moreover, if there exist
signal realizations z and z0 such that both induce the same posterior qS on the sender, but
di↵erent posteriors qR and qR
0
on the receiver (or vice versa), then knowledge of the specific
signal would be necessary to compute the joint distribution of posteriors.
We next show that, given priors pS and pR, posteriors qS and qR form a bijection — qR is
derived from qS through a perspective transformation. Moreover, this transformation is inde-
pendent of the signal ⇡ and signal realization z. Proposition 1 establishes that the martingale
property of the sender’s beliefs and the perspective transformation (4) together characterize
the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that are consistent with Bayesian rationality.
Proposition 1 Let the totally mixed beliefs pS and pR be the prior beliefs of the sender and
the receiver, and let rR✓ be the state-✓ likelihood ratio, r
R
✓ =
pR✓
pS✓
with rR =
 
rR✓
 
✓2⇥. From the
sender’s perspective, a distribution over profiles of posterior beliefs ⌧ 2   (  (⇥)⇥  (⇥))
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is induced by some signal if and only if
(i) if (qS, qR) 2 Supp(⌧), then
qR✓ = q
S
✓
rR✓P
✓02⇥ q
S
✓0r
R
✓0
=
qS✓ r
R
✓
hqS, rRi . (4)
(ii) E⌧ [qS] = pS.
Proposition 1 shows that, in spite of the degrees of freedom a↵orded by heterogenous
priors, not all distributions over posterior beliefs are consistent with Bayesian rationality.
Indeed, (4) implies that two signals that induce the same marginal distribution over the
posterior beliefs of the sender must also induce the same marginal distribution over the
posterior of the receiver. In fact, the set of joint distributions of players posterior beliefs
under common priors and heterogeneous priors form a bijection. That is, belief disagreement
does not allow the sender to generate “more” distributions of posterior beliefs. Equation (4)
relies on both the assumptions of common support of priors and a commonly understood
signal. One implication of a common support of priors is that any signal realization that
leads the receiver to revise his belief must also induce a belief update by the sender — a
signal realization is uninformative to the receiver if and only if it is uninformative to the
sender.10 When players disagree on the likelihood functions that describe ⇡ (as is the case in
Acemoglu et al, 2006 and Van den Steen 2011), then, even for Bayesian players, knowledge
of the marginal distribution of posterior beliefs of one player may not be enough to infer the
entire joint distribution, and thus it may not be enough to compute the sender’s expected
utility from ⇡.
Expression (4) a↵ords a simple interpretation. Heterogenous priors over ✓ imply that, for
a given signal ⇡, with signal space Z, players also disagree on how likely it is to observe each
z 2 Z. Just as the prior disagreement between the receiver and the sender is encoded in the
likelihood ratio rR✓ = p
R
✓ /p
S
✓ ,
11 we can encode the disagreement over z in the likelihood ratio
 Rz =
PrR(z)
PrS(z)
.
10If player j does not update his belief after observing z, then qj✓(z) = p
j
✓, implying that, for player i,⌦
qj(z), ri
↵
= 1 and qj✓(z)r
i
✓ = p
j
✓r
i
✓ = p
i
✓. Therefore, from (4) we must have q
i
✓(z) = p
i
✓.
11For instance, a large class of measures of divergence between two probability distributions µ and ⌫ take
the form
P
✓2⇥ µ✓f
⇣
⌫✓
µ✓
⌘
, which is the expectation of a (convex) function f of the likelihood ratio (Csiszar
1967).
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The proof of Proposition 1 shows that this likelihood ratio can be obtained from rR by
PrR(z)
PrS(z)
=
⌦
qS(z), rR
↵
. (5)
From (4) and (5) we can relate the updated likelihood ratio qR✓ (z)/q
S
✓ (z) to r
R and  Rz ,
qR✓ (z)
qS✓ (z)
=
rR✓
 Rz
. (6)
In words, the new state-✓ likelihood ratio after updating based on z is obtained as the ratio
of the likelihood ratio over states to the likelihood ratio over signal realizations. This implies
that observing a signal realization z that comes more as a “surprise” to the receiver than
the sender (so  Rz < 1) would lead to a larger revision of the receiver’s beliefs and thus a
component-wise increase in the updated likelihood ratio. Moreover, both likelihood ratios
(rR✓ and  
R
z ) are positively related, in the sense that signals that come more as a surprise to
the receiver than the sender are associated with states that the receiver believes to be less
likely to occur.12
As a final remark, note that the likelihood ratio rR is the Radon-Nikodym derivative
of pR with respect to pS. Therefore (4) states that Bayesian updating under a commonly
understood signal simply induces a linear scaling of the Radon-Nikodym derivative. Impor-
tantly, given the sender’s posterior belief, the proportionality factor does not depend on the
signal ⇡.
12Formally, given signal ⇡, consider the probability distribution ⇣j(✓, z) in ⇥ ⇥ Z defined by ⇣j(✓, z) =
⇡(z|✓)pj✓. Define the random variables ri(✓, z) = ri✓ and  i(✓, z) =  iz. Then ri and  i are positively (linear)
correlated under ⇣j(✓, z). To see this note that
E⇣i
⇥
 iri
⇤
=
X
z2Z
X
✓2⇥
⌦
⇡(z), pi
↵
h⇡(z), pji
pi✓
pj✓
⇡(z|✓)pj✓ =
X
z2Z
 ⌦
⇡(z), pi
↵
h⇡(z), pji
!2 ⌦
⇡(z), pj
↵
 
 X
z2Z
⌦
⇡(z), pi
↵
h⇡(z), pji
⌦
⇡(z), pj
↵!2
= 1
E⇣i
⇥
ri
⇤
=
X
z2Z
X
✓2⇥
pi✓
pj✓
⇡(z|✓)pj✓ = 1
E⇣i
⇥
 i
⇤
=
X
z2Z
X
✓2⇥
⌦
⇡(z), pi
↵
h⇡(z), pji⇡(z|✓)p
j
✓ =
X
z2Z
⌦
⇡(z), pi
↵
= 1
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3.2 Value of Information Control
The sender in our setup can neither use monetary incentives, nor restrictions on the re-
ceiver’s choice set, to a↵ect the latter’s decisions. The only alternative available to change
the receiver’s decision is to (literally) change his beliefs over ✓ by providing signal ⇡. There-
fore, the sender’s expected utility from ⇡ is uniquely determined by the sender’s subjective
distribution of posterior beliefs induced by ⇡. In other words, if ⌧ 2   (  (⇥)⇥  (⇥))
represents a distribution over (qS, qR), then the sender’s problem can be written as
V (pS, pR) = sup
⇡
E⌧
⇥
v(qS(z), qR(z))
⇤
(7)
s.t. ⌧ is induced by ⇡,
where ⌧ obtains from ⇡ and the sender’s prior pS, and the receiver’s posterior qR follows
from applying Bayes’ rule to the prior pR.
We use Proposition 1 to translate the optimization problem (7), where the choice set are
joint distributions of (qS, qR), to the following equivalent, but lower dimensional, optimiza-
tion problem, where the choice set are distributions over qS.
V (pS, pR) = sup
 
E 
⇥
v(qS, qR)
⇤
(8)
s.t.   2   (  (⇥)) ,E 
⇥
qS
⇤
= pS,
⇢
qR✓ =
qS✓ r
R
✓
hqS, rRi
 
✓2⇥
,
where the receiver’s posterior beliefs qR are expressed through the perspective transformation
(4) as a function of qS.
The next Proposition establishes that an optimal signal exists, that it can use a limited
number of distinct signal realizations, and computes the sender’s expected utility under an
optimal signal. For this purpose, and following KG, for an arbitrary real-valued function f
define ef as the concave closure of f ,
ef(q) = sup {w|(q, w) 2 co(f)} ,
where co(f) is the convex hull of the graph of f . In other words, ef is the smallest upper
semicontinuous and concave function that (weakly) majorizes the function f .
Proposition 2 (i) An optimal signal exists. Furthermore, there exists an optimal signal
with signal space Z such that card(Z)  min{card(A), card(⇥)}.
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(ii) Define the function VS by
VS
 
qS
 
= v
✓
qS,
qSrR
hqS, rRi
◆
. (9)
The sender’s expected utility under an optimal signal is
V (pS, pR) = eVS  pS  . (10)
The existence of an optimal signal in Proposition 2(i) follows from our assumption of a
finite state space and our focus on equilibria for which v is upper semicontinuous. The charac-
terization in Proposition 2(ii) follows from combining Proposition 1 and the insights provided
by KG. Consider program (8). For any distribution   over posterior beliefs of the sender
induced by some signal, we have that the sender’s expected utility is E 
h
v
⇣
qS, qS r
R
hqS ,rRi
⌘i
with E 
⇥
qS
⇤
= pS. In other words,
⇣
pS,E 
h
v
⇣
qS, qS r
R
hqS ,rRi
⌘i⌘
belongs to the convex hull
of the graph of the function VS given by (9). Moreover, for any point (pS, w) in the convex
hull of the graph of VS there exists a signal that induces  (pS, w) over posteriors of the
sender, and such that w = E (pS ,w)
h
v
⇣
qS, qS r
R
hqS ,rRi
⌘i
with E (pS ,w)
⇥
qS
⇤
= pS. Therefore, the
maximum expected utility of the sender is sup
 
w|(pS, w) 2 co(VS)
 
= eVS  pS .
Our model is essentially static as, once signal ⇡ is selected, all learning is performed
after observing its realization z. Could the sender strictly benefit from further releasing
information contingent on z? Releasing further information is tantamount to inducing a dif-
ferent distribution over posteriors that still has to satisfy Bayesian rationality. In particular,
Proposition 1 still holds for the composition of multiple signals. It follows that the sender
cannot increase her expected utility by sequentially releasing information, since the posterior
beliefs under sequential updating can be replicated with a single signal that induces the same
distribution over beliefs given the state.13 Thus, in contrast to Brocas and Carrillo (2007), se-
quential disclosure has no value as the set of signals available to the sender is su ciently rich.
Proposition 2 shows that the value of information control is eVS  pS    VS  pS . Direct
application of Proposition 2 to establish whether a sender benefits from information control
would require the derivation of the concave closure of an upper semicontinous function, a
13This is similar to the observation made by KG that a sender with full commitment cannot strictly benefit
from sequential disclosure. In our case this remains true given our assumptions of a commonly understood
signal and totally mixed priors.
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task typically not amenable to standard algorithms. Nevertheless, the following Corollary
provides conditions that make it easier to verify if information control is valuable.
Corollary 1 There is no value of information control if and only if there exists a vector
  2 Rcard(⇥) such that ⌦
 , qS   pS↵   VS  qS   VS  pS  , qS 2   (⇥) . (11)
In particular, if VS is di↵erentiable at pS, then there is no value of information control if
and only if ⌦rVS  pS  , qS   pS↵   VS  qS   VS  pS  , qS 2   (⇥) . (12)
This Corollary provides a geometric condition for a sender not to benefit from information
control: a sender optimally releases no information if and only if VS admits a supporting
hyperplane at pS. It is immediate to see that (11) is su cient: consistent beliefs require
that, for any signal that induces distribution   over qS, we must have E 
⇥
qS
⇤
= pS, implying
E 
⇥⌦
 , qS   pS↵⇤ = 0 and 0   E  ⇥VS  qS ⇤  VS  pS  . Conversely, Proposition 2 establishes
that if there is no value of information control, then eVS  pS  = VS  pS . As  eVS is a proper,
convex function, any element from the non-empty set of subdi↵erentials @
⇣
 eVS  pS ⌘ would
provide a majorizing a ne function to eVS and hence to VS.
We conclude this section by pointing out that in some applications it will be convenient
to rewrite the sender’s problem as follows. Define a new utility function for the sender,
uˇS(a, ✓) =
uS(a, ✓)
rR✓
. (13)
For any signal ⇡ = (Z, {⇡ (·|✓)}✓2⇥) and the receiver’s decision rule a(z), z 2 Z, we have
ES [uS(a(z), ✓)] =
X
✓2⇥
X
z2Z
⇡(z|✓)pS✓ uS(a(z), ✓) =
X
✓2⇥
X
z2Z
⇡(z|✓)pR✓
uS(a(z), ✓)
rR✓
= ER [uˇS(a(z), ✓)] .
That is, given the receiver’s behavior, the expected utility of a sender with prior pS and
utility uS is the same as the expected utility of a sender who shares the receiver’s prior
pR, but has utility uˇS. Therefore, under a commonly understood signal one can con-
vert the sender’s original problem to one with common priors as follows. Rewrite (1) as
vˇ
 
qS, qR
  ⌘P✓2⇥ qS✓ uˇS(a(qR), ✓), and define
VR
 
qR
 
= vˇ
 
qR, qR
 
. (14)
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Then the claims of Proposition 2 remain valid if one substitutes VR
 
qR
 
for VS
 
qS
 
. How-
ever, note that in many cases the transformed utility uˇS is hard to interpret and defend on
economic grounds. Moreover, by maintaining the original formulation one is able to gather a
better economic understanding of the e↵ects of a commonly understood signal on heteroge-
neous priors. For example, an important result in Section 4 is that on the space of priors the
sender generically benefits from information control. Such result would be hard to postulate
and interpret if one only examines the transformed problem.
3.3 The Value of Garbling
Our previous analysis is well suited to cases where, absent the sender’s signal, receivers
would not be able to acquire further information on their own. In many situations, however, a
sender’s influence takes the form of obfuscation or “signal jamming”, i.e. a sender attempts to
“confound” receivers by garbling the information that would otherwise reach them. Corollary
2 provides a simple necessary and su cient condition for a sender to benefit from introducing
noise into a fully informative signal observed by the receiver. That is, under these conditions
a fully revealing signal does not solve the sender’s problem defined by (8). For this purpose,
let 1✓ be the posterior belief that puts probability 1 on state ✓.
Corollary 2 A sender does not benefit from garbling a perfectly informative signal if and
only if X
✓2⇥
qS✓ uS(a(1✓), ✓)   VS
 
qS
 
, qS 2   (⇥) . (15)
Condition (15) admits a simple interpretation. Suppose that players observe a signal
realization that induces qS in the sender. The right hand side of (15) is the sender’s expected
utility if she discloses no more information, while the left hand side of (15) is the sender’s
expected utility if she allows the receiver to perfectly learn the state. Then a sender does
not benefit from garbling a perfectly informative signal if and only if after every possible
signal and signal realization she is not worse o↵ by fully revealing the state.
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4 Pure Persuasion
In this section we apply our results to the case when the sender’s utility is independent of
the state, i.e. the case of “pure persuasion”. We first show that there is always a prior belief
disagreement that renders information control valuable. We then characterize when and why
a sender values information control, as a function of the players preferences and the extent
of prior belief disagreement. In particular, we show that if the receiver’s action is a linear
function of his beliefs, then information control is generically valuable and the optimal signal
is often not fully revealing of the state.
4.1 The Role of Heterogenous Priors
What are the possible reasons for a sender to benefit from designing a receiver’s access to
information? The literature has explored two broad sources of value from information control
under the assumption of a common prior. One source is based on the value of information: a
sender who benefits from adapting decisions to the underlying state would certainly benefit
from providing an informative signal to a decision maker that shares her preferences. The
other source is based on conflicting interests. For instance, under pure persuasion, the sender
draws no value from knowing the state if she could make decisions herself. However, KG and
Brocas and Carrillo (2007) show that she can still benefit from information control if it is
a receiver who instead makes decisions — when players share a common prior, information
control is valuable when the sender can exploit the non-concavity of the receiver’s action in
his beliefs, or the convexity of the sender’s utility function in the receiver’s actions.
We now argue that open disagreement provides a third, distinct rationale for a sender to
benefit from information control. To make our point as clear as possible, Proposition 3 con-
siders a pure persuasion setup where uS(a(qR)) is everywhere concave, so that both previous
rationales are absent: under common priors the sender does not benefit from information
control as the function VS given by (9) is everywhere concave. Proposition 3 shows that
belief disagreement can reverse this result.
Proposition 3 (i) Suppose that uS(a(qR)) is twice-continuously di↵erentiable and for each
belief qR 2   (⇥) the Hessian Matrix of uS(a(qR)) is negative definite. Then for any totally
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mixed prior pR there exists a neighborhood of pR such that a sender with prior belief pS 2
N(pR) does not benefit from information control.
(ii) For every bounded uS and totally mixed prior pR for which
uS(a(p
R)) < max
qR2 (⇥)
uS(a(q
R)),
there exists a totally mixed pS such that a sender with prior pS benefits from information
control.
Proposition 3(i) states that, as long as uS(a(qR)) is strictly concave for all directions in
which beliefs may be updated, then small belief disagreements are not su cient for a sender
to provide some information to a receiver. Nevertheless, Proposition 3(ii) shows that if the
receiver is not already choosing the sender’s preferred decision, then there always exists a
level of prior belief disagreement such that information control is valuable. The logic of
the proof is simple: if the sender’s utility increases when the receiver has a belief q˜R 6= pR,
then one can construct a signal ⇡ and a belief pS such that a sender with prior pS expects
signal ⇡ to induce q˜R almost certainly. Interestingly, it is not a sender with prior belief
pS = q˜R the one who is most confident of inducing q˜R in the receiver. Indeed, the proof
of the Proposition constructs a signal ⇡ that induces two di↵erent posteriors, where one of
them is q˜R, and shows that a sender becomes more confident of inducing q˜R through ⇡ as
her prior belief puts more probability on the state ✓0 that maximizes q˜R✓ /p
R
✓ , i.e. on the state
✓0 such that q˜R✓0/p
R
✓0   q˜R✓ /pR✓ , ✓ 2 ⇥.
4.2 Value of Information Control under Pure Persuasion
When does a sender benefit from providing an informative signal to a receiver under pure
persuasion? To answer this question, we rewrite function VR defined in (14) as
VR(q
R) = ER
⇥
uˇS(a(q
R))
⇤
= uS(a(q
R))ER

1
rR
 
= uS(a(q
R))
⌦
qR, rS
↵
, (16)
with rS✓ = p
S
✓ /p
R
✓ , r
S =
 
rS✓
 
✓2⇥. Representation (16) suggests that to understand the
sender’s gain from information control one should consider the sender’s risk preferences over
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decisions, the shape of the receiver’s actions given his beliefs, and the extent of prior belief
disagreement as captured by
⌦
qR, rS
↵
= PrS(qR)/PrR(qR) .
To simplify the exposition, we assume A ⇢ R and u0S > 0 so that the sender’s utility is
increasing in the receiver’s action. If the sender and the receiver share a common prior, then⌦
qR, rS
↵
= 1 and the value of information control is obtained directly from the curvature
of uS(a(qR)). Given u0S > 0, a concave uS and a(q
R) imply that uS(a(qR)) is concave and
the sender does not benefit from information control. However, if uS is strictly convex and
a(qR) is convex, then uS(a(qR)) is strictly convex and the sender benefits from information
control. That is, as shown by KG, under a common prior belief the sender can benefit from
the provision of a signal by exploiting non-concavities in the receiver’s action, or her own
positive attitude towards risk.
Proposition 4 emphasizes the role of the curvature of the receiver’s action. We first
establish that the sender can exploit non-concavities in the action of the receiver to her
advantage, irrespective of her risk attitudes and of the extent of belief disagreement. We
then characterize situations in which the sender benefits from information control even when
a(qR) is concave.
Proposition 4 Suppose A ⇢ R, u0S > 0 and a(qR) is twice continuously di↵erentiable. Let
A+ =
 
qR 2   (⇥) : a(qR) > a(pR) be the (open) upper contour set of the receiver’s action
at the prior belief pR, T =
 
qR 2   (⇥) : ⌦ra(pR), qR   pR↵ = 0 be the tangent hyperplane
of a(qR) at pR, H(a(pR)) be the Hessian matrix of a(qR) at qR = pR, and W defined in (3).
(i) Suppose that ra(pR)kW 6= 0. If T \ A+ 6= ;, then the value of information control is
positive for all pS 2 int(  (⇥)) and for all strictly increasing uS. In particular, if the re-
striction of H(a(pR)) to T is not negative semidefinite then the value of information control
is positive.
(ii) Suppose that a(qR) is concave at qR = pR. Let  min be the smallest eigenvalue of
H(a(pR)), and define
m = ra(pR),
n =
u00S(a(p
R))
u0S(a(pR))
ra(pR) + 2rS.
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If the projections m||W and n||W of m and n on W satisfy
1
2
  m||W     n||W   h1 + cos  m||W , n||W   i > | min| , (17)
then the sender benefits from information control.
As the proof of the Proposition shows, under the conditions of Proposition 4(i) the sender
can always find a signal such that every signal realization induces the receiver to choose
a strictly higher action. Therefore, a sender with monotone preferences will increase her
expected utility with this signal, irrespective of her risk attitudes and of the extent of belief
disagreement. Suppose now that the action of the receiver is concave in his beliefs, so that
the set of posterior beliefs that weakly raise the receiver’s action is convex and the conditions
of Proposition 4(i) do not hold. The martingale property of posterior beliefs implies that any
signal that induces higher actions in the receiver must also have signal realizations that lead
the receiver to choose a lower action. When this is the case, the sender’s risk preferences and
the extent of prior belief disagreement play a role in dictating whether the sender benefits
from information control. Proposition 4(ii) provides conditions such that information control
can be valuable, even when uS(a(qR)) is concave. Recall from (16) that VR is the product
of uS(a(qR)) and the concave function
⌦
qR, rS
↵
. Condition (17) guarantees that the product
of these two concave functions is locally strictly convex in at least one direction of feasible
posterior beliefs.
4.3 Persuading Skeptics and Believers
Proposition 4(ii) provides su cient conditions for the sender to benefit from information
control when she cannot depend on non-concavities in the receiver’s action. In this section
we maintain the assumption u0S > 0 and restrict attention to the subcase of Proposition
4(ii) where the receiver’s action exhibits linear increments in beliefs. This assumption is
equivalent to the existence of a random variable x such that a(qR) satisfies
a(qR) =
X
✓2⇥
qR✓ x(✓) =
⌦
qR, x
↵
, (18)
where, to avoid trivialities, we assume that x is non-constant.
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This action choice is consistent with a receiver with preferences uR(a, ✓) =   (a  x(✓))2.
For instance, in many political economy models and in the example in the Introduction,
action a can be interpreted as a policy choice in a left-right policy spectrum. Alternatively,
(18) can be derived in a moral hazard setup in which uR(a, ✓) = x(✓)a   a22 , where x(✓)
is the receiver’s marginal benefit of e↵ort, and a
2
2 is his personal cost of e↵ort; or in a
resource allocation problem with an infinitely divisible budget of 1 which the receiver needs
to allocate between two projects, when his utility from allocating a to the first project is
uR(a, ✓) = x(✓) ln a  (1  x(✓)) ln(1  a). In all these cases, the sender would like to induce
the highest possible action by providing information that induces in the receiver the highest
possible expectation of x.14
The specification (18) allows a simple categorization of the type of receiver that the
sender may face. A sender views a receiver as holding adverse beliefs if she would be made
better o↵ by a receiver who shares her point of view, that is, if
⌦
qR, x
↵
<
⌦
qS, x
↵
. (19)
Conversely, a sender views a receiver as holding favorable beliefs if she would not be made
better o↵ by the receiver sharing her point of view, that is, if
⌦
qR, x
↵   ⌦qS, x↵ . (20)
When (19) holds we refer to the receiver as a “skeptic,” and when (20) holds as a “believer”.
If the sender faces a skeptic, a fully revealing signal would raise her expectation over
the receiver’s actions. If instead the sender faces a believer, a fully revealing signal would
(weakly) decrease her expectation over the receiver’s actions. Whether such signal raises
or decreases the sender’s expected utility will depend on her risk preferences. Nevertheless,
14Our results in this Section translate readily to the more general setup where, for each qR, the indirect
utility of the sender can be written as an increasing function of the receiver’s expectation of x, uS(a(qR)) =
F (ER[x(✓)]), with F 0(·)   0. For example, consider a receiver who takes a binary action {0, 1}, and chooses
action 1 if and only if ER[✓]   ⌘ (e.g., vote for candidate A or B, approve or not approve a project, vote to
convict or to acquit a defendant). The random variable ⌘ follows some distribution F , is orthogonal to ✓, and
becomes public information after the sender chooses the signal, but before the receiver chooses his action.
The sender receives payo↵ 1 if action 1 is taken, and zero otherwise. In this case, the sender’s expected
utility becomes ES [uS(a⇤(qR))] = Pr(ER[✓]   ⌘) = F (ER[✓]).
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Proposition 5 shows that when the sender has access to a richer set of signals and the state
space includes at least three states, then the sender generically benefits from information
control, regardless of whether she is facing a skeptic or a believer, and regardless of her risk
attitudes.15 To present our results we recall the following definition.
Definition: Vectors v and w are negatively collinear with respect to the subspace Q if there
exist   < 0 such that the projections v||Q and w||Q satisfy
v||Q =  w||Q. (21)
In particular, by considering Q = W , with W defined by (3), condition (21) is equivalent to
the existence of  0 and  1 > 0 such that
v =  01   1w,
or, alternatively, to the existence of  1 > 0 such that
v✓   v✓0 =   1 (w✓   w✓0) , ✓, ✓0 2 ⇥. (22)
Our interest in this definition is given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Every signal realization z of a signal ⇡ that increases the receiver’s action is
perceived to be more likely by the receiver than by the sender if and only if x and rS are
negatively collinear with respect to W , defined by (3).
We now state our main proposition in this Section.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the receiver’s action is given by (18), card(⇥) > 2, uS is twice
continuously di↵erentiable with u0S > 0, and p
R 6= pS.
(i) If x and rS are not negatively collinear w.r.t. W , then the sender benefits from informa-
tion control.
(ii) If uS is concave, then the sender benefits from information control if and only if x and
rS are not negatively collinear w.r.t. W .
15Genericity is interpreted over the space of pairs of prior beliefs.
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When there are at least three states and regardless of the curvature of uS, Proposition
5(i) implies that the sender benefits from information control whenever she can construct a
signal ⇡ and a signal realization z to which she assigns more probability than the receiver,
and z increases the receiver’s action (by Lemma 1). Moreover, if uS is concave, so that
information control has no value under a common prior, then information control has value
under heterogenous priors if and only if x and rS are not negatively collinear w.r.t. W . One
important implication of Proposition 5, given Lemma 1, is that if the state space is rich
enough and x is injective (i.e. takes di↵erent values for di↵erent states), then the sender
generically benefits from information control under belief disagreement, regardless of the
curvature of the utility function uS.
To provide some intuition for Proposition 5, define ⇤ =
 
qR :
⌦
qR   pR, x↵ = 0, qR 2   (⇥) ,
which is a hyperplane of beliefs that includes the prior of the receiver, and such that the
receiver’s action is constant in ⇤. One can then find signals supported on ⇤ that leave the
expected utility of the sender unchanged. Moreover, if x and rS are not collinear, then the
sender and the receiver generically disagree over the likelihood of any posterior qR in ⇤.
The sender can then exploit this disagreement by switching to a signal that modifies the
posterior of the receiver in the direction of a higher action only for those beliefs that the
sender perceives as more likely than the receiver. If the state is binary, however, then ⇤ is a
singleton and the previous argument cannot be applied.
4.4 Garbling Information to Skeptics and Believers
In many situations, the e↵ect of lobbying is to reduce the amount of information that reaches
decision makers. To examine these situations, suppose that the receiver perfectly learns the
state if the sender does not engage in information control. When would the sender benefit
from reducing the information that reaches the receiver? To answer this question we apply
Corollary 2 to the function VS in (9) when the receiver’s action satisfies (18), which here
takes the simple form
VS(q
S) = uS
 ⌦
qS, rRx
↵
hqS, rRi
!
. (23)
Expression (23) suggests that the sender’s gain from garbling depends both on her “risk
attitudes” (i.e. on the curvature of uS) and the type of receiver she is facing. The next
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proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 6 (i) Suppose that uS is convex, x non-decreasing in ✓, and16 pS ⌫LR pR.
Then the sender does not benefit from garbling. (ii) Suppose that uS is absolutely continuous
and there exist states ✓ and ✓0 such that
(x (✓0)  x (✓))
⇣ 
rS✓0
 2
u0S (x (✓
0))   rS✓  2 u0S (x (✓))⌘ < 0. (24)
Then the sender benefits from garbling.
It is immediate to see that any garbling reduces the variance of the receiver’s posterior
beliefs. Moreover, likelihood ratio orders are preserved under Bayesian updating. In par-
ticular, if pS ⌫LR pR, then the receiver will remain a skeptic after any signal realization
that does not fully reveal the state, meaning that by fully revealing the state the sender
can increase, on average, the receiver’s action. Proposition 6(i) establishes that when uS is
convex and the receiver remains a skeptic after every partially informative signal, then the
sender cannot do better than letting the receiver fully learn the state. That is, garbling is
not valuable. Nevertheless, Proposition 6(ii) argues that if at least one of these conditions
is relaxed, then garbling is valuable as long as (24) is satisfied. For example, it follows from
(24) that if uS is linear and pS ✏LR pR, then the sender benefits from garbling, even if the
receiver is a skeptic. Proposition 6(ii) also implies that if pR ⌫LR pS and uS is concave, then
the sender would optimally restrict the information available to the receiver.
4.5 Optimal Signal
When information control is valuable, what is the optimal signal? To provide some intuition,
we now restrict attention to the case in which the sender’s utility is linear, uS =  a,   6= 0,
and a(qR) satisfies (18) with x = ✓, so that the receiver’s action is the expected state. The
sender’s optimal signal maximizes ES [ER [✓|⇡]] when   > 0, and minimizes ES [ER [✓|⇡]]
when   < 0. With a common prior, this expectation is constant in the space of all signals,
thus information control is not valuable. With heterogenous priors, however, the sender can
always find a signal that increases or decreases, on average, the receiver’s expectation over
✓, as long as ✓||W and rS||W are not collinear.
16The order ⌫LR denotes the likelihood ratio order as in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, pg 42).
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Corollary 3 Suppose that the state ✓ and the likelihood ratio pS✓ /p
R
✓ are not collinear w.r.t.
W . Then there exist signals ⇡ and ⇡0 such that ES [ER [✓|⇡]] < ER [✓] < ES [ER [✓|⇡0]] .
Proposition 7 characterizes an optimal signal when   > 0, and it is straightforward to
restate the proposition in the case   < 0.
Proposition 7 Suppose that uS =  a,   > 0, and a(qR) satisfies (18) with x = ✓. Then
(i) after each realization of an optimal signal the receiver is a believer;
(ii) if every combination of three elements of ✓ and rS are not negatively collinear, then
after each realization of an optimal signal the receiver puts positive probability in at most
two states;
(iii) a completely uninformative signal is optimal if and only if ✓||W and rS||W are negatively
collinear;
(iv) a fully revealing signal is optimal if and only if pS ⌫LR pR.
Proposition 7 obtains from Propositions 5 and 6 with the aid of two simple observations.
First, optimization by the sender implies that there is no value in further releasing any
information after any signal realization. In particular, the conditions in Proposition 5 must
hold after each realization of an optimal signal. Second, negative collinearity of ✓ and
rS w.r.t. W and likelihood ratio order relations between beliefs are both preserved under
Bayesian updating17. This follows trivially from (6) as Bayesian updating induces a rescaling
of likelihood ratios.
Proposition 7(i) follows from the fact that if a signal realization leaves the receiver being
a skeptic, then the sender would strictly benefit from fully disclosing the state, contradict-
ing the premise of optimality. Proposition 7(ii) exploits the invariance of collinearity under
Bayesian updating: if no three components of ✓ and rS are negatively collinear, then an op-
timal signal must narrow down the receiver’s uncertainty to at most two states. Proposition
7(iii) and (iv) follow immediately from Propositions 5 and 6, respectively.
We now apply our results to solve for the optimal signal in the example presented in the
Introduction. There are three possible states, ✓ 2 {0, 0.5, 1}, and the sender’s utility is linear
in the receiver’s expectation of ✓. Consider priors pR = (0.4, 0.5, 0.1) for the receiver and
17To be precise, this is true when considering only the elements in the support of the posteriors.
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pS = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) for the sender, so that the receiver is a skeptic. The likelihood ratio and the
state are not negatively collinear, hence the sender benefits from persuasion (Proposition 5).
Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that there is an optimal signal with at most three signal
realizations. We now use Proposition 7 to solve the problem without having to explicitly
derive the concave closure of VS. First, after every signal realization the players must attach
positive probability to at most two states — cf. Proposition 7(ii). Second, after each signal
realization the players cannot attach positive probabilities to states 0 and 1 at the same
time, nor to states 0.5 and 1 at the same time, otherwise the receiver would be a “skeptic”
— cf. Proposition 7(i). Consequently, after each realization of an optimal signal, players
must know with certainty whether state 1 occurred or not. Does the sender benefit from
further disclosing information about states 0 and 0.5? Note that conditional on learning that
state 1 has not occurred, the receiver becomes a “believer”, and there are only two possible
states left. Further information disclosure is not beneficial since likelihood ratios and the
state are negatively collinear in the partition {0, 0.5}. Thus, the optimal signal only reveals
whether ✓ = 1 or not.
Now consider the “believer” case in the second part of the example, pR = (0.1, 0.5, 0.4).
After each signal realization, individuals cannot assign positive probability to states 0.5 and
1 at the same time, otherwise ✓ and rS are not negatively collinear and further information
disclosure is optimal. Moreover, conditional on learning that the state is not 1, further
information disclosure is not optimal because ✓ and rS are negatively collinear in the partition
{0, 0.5}. Similarly, conditional on learning that the state is not 0.5, further information
disclosure is not optimal. Therefore, we can focus on a binary signal {zL, zH}, where state
0.5 generates signal zL with probability one, state 1 generates signal zH with probability one,
and state 0 generates signal zL with probability ↵ and zH with probability 1   ↵. In this
example, the sender’s expected utility decreases in ↵,18 hence her optimal choice is ↵ = 0.
18Her expected utility is
 
1
3 + ↵
1
3
  ⇣
0.5 0.50.5+↵0.1
⌘
+
 
1
3 + (1  ↵) 13
  ⇣
1 0.40.4+(1 ↵)0.1
⌘
.
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5 Private Priors
So far we have assumed that the sender knows the prior belief of the receiver. It is immediate
to extend the analysis to a case in which the sender is uncertain about the receiver’s prior be-
liefs when designing the signal ⇡. Suppose for concreteness that prior beliefs are drawn from
a distribution H(pR, pS) with conditional distribution h(pR|pS).19 Proposition 1 still applies
for each (pR, pS). Consequently, given pS and h(pR|pS), knowledge of the sender’s posterior
qS su ces to compute the joint distribution of posterior beliefs. Moreover, the restriction
to language-invariant equilibria implies that, given realization (pR, pS), the receiver’s choice
only depends on his posterior belief qR. Therefore, after a signal realization that induces
posterior qS, we can compute the sender’s expected payo↵ VS using the implied distribution
of qR. More specifically, (9) translates to
VS
 
qS
 
= ES[v(q
S, qR)|pS] =
Z
v
0@qS, qS pRpSD
qS, p
R
pS
E
1A dh(pR|pS). (25)
With this modification, the expected utility of a sender under an optimal signal is eVS  pS 
and the sender would benefit from information control under the conditions of Corollary 1.
Moreover, the expected value to the sender of a perfectly informative signal is independent of
the receiver’s prior belief. Therefore, the value of garbling is positive whenever (25) satisfies
the conditions in Corollary 2.
As an application of (25), consider the pure persuasion model from Section 4. When the
sender knows the receiver’s prior, Proposition 5(i) provides conditions on the likelihood ratio
of priors such that information control is valuable. Suppose these conditions are met and the
sender strictly benefits from providing signal ⇡ to a particular receiver. By a continuity ar-
gument, the same signal ⇡ strictly benefits the sender when she faces another receiver whose
beliefs are not too di↵erent. Consequently, even if the sender does not know the receiver’s
prior, information control remains beneficial when the receiver’s possible priors are not too
dispersed. Proposition 8 provides an upper bound on how dispersed these beliefs can be. To
19Note that the receiver’s preferences are una↵ected by his beliefs about the sender’s prior. Therefore, the
sender’s choice of signal conveys no additional information to the receiver. This would not be true if the
sender privately observes a signal about the state. See Sethi and Yildiz (2012) for a model of communication
where players have private prior beliefs and also receive a private signal about the state.
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this end, let R be the set of likelihood ratios induced by the priors in the support of h(pR|pS),
R =
 
rR : {rR✓ = pR✓ /pS✓ }✓2⇥, pR 2 Supp(h(pR|pS))
 
. (26)
Proposition 8 Suppose that rR and rRx are not collinear w.r.t. W for all rR 2 R, and let
m = 12
max|u00S(a)|
minu0S(a)
> 0. If for all rR, rR
0 2 R   rR   rR0      , (27)
with   given by (46), then the sender benefits from information control.
The condition on rR and rRx implies that if the sender knew the receiver’s prior, then
she could find a signal with a positive value (cf. Proposition 5). The bound  (m) is defined
by (46) in the Appendix B, as a function of the curvature of uS. From (27),  (m) represents
a lower bound on the cosine of the angle between any two likelihood ratios in the support of
h(pR|pS). Therefore, (27) describes how di↵erent the receiver’s possible prior beliefs can be
for the sender still to benefit from information control, by imposing an upper bound on the
angle between any two likelihood ratios in R.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the gain to an individual (sender) from controlling the information
available to a decision maker (receiver) when they openly disagree on their views of the world.
Our first contribution is to characterize the set of distributions over posterior beliefs that
can be induced through a signal, under our assumption of “commonly understood signal”
(i.e., when players agree on the statistical relation of the signal to the payo↵-relevant state).
This allows us to compute the gain from information control, both when the receiver would
otherwise remained uninformed and when the receiver would perfectly learn the state absent
the sender’s influence. One implication of our analysis is that di↵erences in prior beliefs are
a separate rationale for persuasion, and that, under mild conditions, there always exists a
di↵erence in prior beliefs that renders information control valuable.
In Section 4 we apply our results to a large class of pure persuasion models, where the
sender’s payo↵ is an increasing function of the receiver’s expectation of a random variable.
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One could think that a sender would be hurt by providing information to an overly optimistic
receiver, as she expects information to corroborate her pessimistic point of view. However,
we show that if the state space is rich enough, then the sender generically benefits from
providing some information, even when facing an overly optimistic receiver. Moreover, this
result does not depend on the sender’s risk-attitudes. We then analyze the gain from garbling
an otherwise fully informative signal. We show that a sender may benefit from garbling the
signal even in situations when the receiver holds overly pessimistic beliefs.
To focus on the impact of heterogeneous priors on information control, we have restricted
our analysis in several ways. First, we have eschewed the possibility that the sender has pri-
vate information. Second, we consider a single receiver. In many situations, however, the
sender may want to a↵ect the beliefs of a collective, where she is typically constrained to use
a public signal. Third, we have considered a fixed decision making process. However, in some
instances the sender can both o↵er a contract and provide some information to a receiver, i.e.
the sender designs a grand-mechanism that specifies the information to be released and sev-
eral contractible variables. Similarly, one can examine how the optimal signal varies across
di↵erent mechanisms of preference aggregation (e.g., Alonso and Caˆmara 2014 examine in-
formation control in a voting model). We leave these promising extensions for future work.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Necessity : Consider a signal ⇡ =
 
Z, {⇡ (·|✓)}✓2⇥
 
that induces,
from the sender’s perspective, the distribution ⌧ and let ⇡(z) = {⇡ (z|✓)}✓2⇥ and qR(z) and
qS(z) be the posterior beliefs of the receiver and the sender if z 2 Z is realized. Clearly, the
marginal distribution over the sender’s posterior beliefs satisfies the martingale property,
i.e. E⌧ [qS] = pS. Furthermore, as priors are totally mixed, the receiver assigns positive
probability to z if and only if the sender also assigns positive probability to z.20 Suppose
then that ⇡(z) 6= 0. Bayesian updating implies that, after observing z, the sender’s posterior
is
qS✓ (z) =
⇡(z|✓)pS✓
h⇡(z), pSi ,
20Indeed, we have PrR [z] =
⌦
⇡(z), pR
↵
= 0, ⇡ (z|✓) = 0, ✓ 2 ⇥, PrS [z] =
⌦
⇡(z), pS
↵
= 0.
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so we can write
qS✓ (z)
⌦
⇡(z), pS
↵ pR✓
pS✓
= ⇡(z|✓)pR✓ ,
and summing over ✓ 2 ⇥ we obtain⌦
⇡(z), pS
↵ ⌦
qS(z), rR
↵
=
⌦
⇡(z), pR
↵
.
Then we can relate the two posterior beliefs by
qR✓ (z) =
⇡(z|✓)pR✓
h⇡(z), pRi =
⇡(z|✓)pS✓
h⇡(z), pSi hqS(z), rRi
pR✓
pS✓
= qS✓ (z)
rR✓
hqS(z), rRi .
Su ciency : Given a distribution ⌧ satisfying (i) and (ii), let ⌧S(qS) be the marginal distri-
bution of the sender’s posterior beliefs and define the signal space Z =
 
qS : qS 2 Supp(⌧S)
 
and the likelihood functions ⇡(qS|✓) = qS✓ Pr⌧S qS
pS✓
. Then simple calculations reveal that the
signal ⇡ =
⇣
Z,
 
⇡(qS|✓) 
✓2⇥
⌘
induces ⌧ . ⌅
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (i) See KG. Part (ii) In the text.
Proof of Corollary 1: The first part of the claim can be rephrased in terms of the subdi↵er-
ential @V (p) of a function V evaluated at p, which we take to be the set of linear functionals
f such that
f(q   p)  V (q)  V (p), q 2 RN .
With this terminology, the first part of Corollary 1 states that the sender does not benefit
from information control if and only if @
  VS(pS)  6= ?. The second part of Corollary 1
then follows immediately as, if VS is di↵erentiable at pS, then @
  VS(pS)  can have at most
one element.
Su ciency : As the concave closure eVS is the lower envelope of all a ne functions that ma-
jorize VS and, by assumption, the majorizing a ne function f
 
qS
 
= VS
 
pS
 
+
⌦
 , qS   pS↵
satisfies VS
 
pS
 
= f
 
pS
 
, then
VS
 
pS
 
= f
 
pS
    eVS  pS    VS  pS  ,
implying that eVS  pS  = VS  pS  and, by Proposition 2, there is no value of information
control.
Necessity : Suppose that there is no value of information control. From Proposition 2 this
implies that eVS  pS  = VS  pS . As eVS is the concave closure of an upper semicontinuous
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function in a compact set, the di↵erential of  eVS  qS  is non-empty for all qS 2 int(  (⇥)).
Any element of @
⇣
 eVS(pS)⌘ would then satisfy (11). ⌅
Proof of Corollary 2: Su ciency : Suppose that (15) is satisfied. Then any signal ⇡ that,
from the sender’s point of view, induces the distribution over posterior beliefs   must satisfy
E 
⇥
qS
⇤
= pS, implying that
X
✓2⇥
pS✓ uS(a(1✓), ✓) = E 
"X
✓2⇥
qS✓ uS(a(1✓), ✓)
#
  E 
⇥
VS
 
qS
 ⇤
.
Thus, a fully informative signal weakly dominates any other signal ⇡ and is thus optimal.
Necessity : Fix any belief qS 2   (⇥) and let  ¯ be defined as
 ¯ = max
⇢
  : pS✓  
 
1    (q
S
✓   pS✓ )   0,   2 [0, 1]
 
As the prior belief pS 2 int(  (⇥)) we have 1 >  ¯ > 0. Letting 1✓ be the belief that assigns
probability 1 to state ✓, consider now a signal that induces belief qS with probability  ¯ and
belief 1✓ with probability (1    ¯)
⇣
pS✓    ¯1  ¯ (qS✓   pS✓ )
⌘
= pS✓    qS✓   0 for each ✓ 2 ⇥. The
expected utility of the sender under this signal is
 VS
 
qS
 
+
X
✓2⇥
 
pS✓    qS✓
 
uS(a(1✓), ✓) =  
 
VS
 
qS
  X
✓2⇥
qS✓ uS(a(1✓), ✓)
!
+
X
✓2⇥
pS✓ uS(a(1✓), ✓).
Full disclosure is optimal by assumption, therefore we must have
 
 
VS
 
qS
  X
✓2⇥
qS✓ uS(a(1✓), ✓)
!
+
X
✓2⇥
pS✓ uS(a(1✓), ✓) 
X
✓2⇥
pS✓ uS(a(1✓), ✓),
which, given that  ¯ > 0, we must then necessarily have (15). ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3: Part (i). Letting uˆS(qR) = uS(a(qR)), (14) translates to
VR(q
R) =
⌦
qR, rS
↵
uˆS(q
R),
with gradient
rVR(pR) = uˆS(pR)rS +ruˆS(pR).
Let W be the subspace of “marginal beliefs”, and for qR 2   (⇥) let   2 R and " 2 W be
such that qR = pR+  " with " unitary (i.e. h", "i = 1). Then the condition (12) in Corollary
1 can be expressed as, ⌦rVR(pR),  "↵   VR(qR)  VR(pR),
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which can be expanded to
uˆS(p
R)
⌦
rS,  "
↵
+
⌦ruˆS(pR),  "↵   ⌦qR, rS↵ uˆS(qR)  uˆS(pR),
uˆS(p
R) +
⌦ruˆS(pR),  "↵  uˆS(qR)    uˆS(qR)  uˆS(pR)  ⌦rS,  "↵ . (28)
The left hand side of (28) is the excess of the linear approximation uˆS(pR) +
⌦ruˆS(pR),  "↵
over the function uˆS(qR), which is positive for concave uˆS. The mean value theorem in
integral form implies
uˆS(p
R) +
⌦ruˆS(pR),  "↵  uˆS(qR) =   Z 1
0
⌦ruˆS(pR + t "),  "↵ dt+ ⌦ruˆS(pR),  "↵
=  
Z 1
0
⌦ruˆS(pR + t ") ruˆS(pR),  "↵ dt
=   2"TM ( ") ",
where
(M ( "))✓i✓j =
Z 1
0
Z t
0
@2uˆS(pR + ⌧ ")
@qR✓i@q
R
✓j
d⌧dt.
Therefore (28) translates to
  2"TM ( ") "   ⌦rS,  "↵⌧Z 1
0
ruˆS(pR + t ")dt,  "
 
,
 "TM ( ") "   ⌦rS, "↵⌧Z 1
0
ruˆS(pR + t ")dt, "
 
. (29)
We finish our proof by making three observations. First, a negative definite Hessian implies
that the left hand side of (29) is bounded away from zero for     0. Let ⇠ be such a bound, i.e.
 "TM ( ") "   ⇠ > 0, for all ( , ") such that h", "i = 1,   2 [0, 1].
Second, smoothness of uˆS implies that the term
   DR 10 ruˆS(pR + t ")dt, ⌘E    is uniformly
bounded in {( , ") : h", "i = 1,   2 [0, 1]}. LetM be such an upper bound. Third, the prior of
the sender only enters (29) through the term
⌦
rS, "
↵
. Clearly, if the sender and the receiver
share a common prior then rS = 1 and
⌦
rS, "
↵
= 0. As
⌦
rS, "
↵
is continuous in pS and⌦
rS, "
↵
= 0 when pS = pR, then there exists a neighborhood of pR, N(pR), such that for
pS 2 N(pR) we have   ⌦rS, "↵   < ⇠/M . That is, condition (29) is satisfied, implying that the
sender does not benefit from information control for every pS 2 N(pR).
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Part (ii). Suppose that for belief qR(+) we have uˆS(pR) < uˆS(qR(+)). Define the collection
of signals {⇡ ( ) ,   2 ⌅ ⇢ [0, 1]}, such that each signal induces only two posteriors, qR(+)
and qR( ), with
qR✓ ( ) = pR✓  
 
1    (q
R
✓ (+)  pR✓ ),
and where the receiver assigns probability   to qR(+). Let  ¯ be the maximum admissible  
 ¯ = max
 
  : qR( ) 2   (⇥) .
The full support assumption on pR implies  ¯ > 0. Furthermore, from the definition of qR✓ ( ),
we have
1   ¯
1   ¯
✓
max
✓2⇥
qR✓ (+)
pR✓
  1
◆
= 0,
yielding
 ¯ =
1
max✓2⇥
qR✓ (+)
pR✓
.
From (5) the probability that a sender with prior pS assigns to the signal ⇡
 
 ¯
 
inducing
qR(+) in the receiver is
PrS(q
R(+)) = PrR(q
R(+))
⌦
qR(+), rS
↵
=  ¯
⌦
qR(+), rS
↵
=
X
✓2⇥
pS✓
qR✓ (+)/p
R
✓
max✓2⇥ qR✓ (+)/p
R
✓
. (30)
Let  
 
 ¯, pS
 
be the sender’s expected gain from signal ⇡
 
 ¯
 
, i.e.
 
 
 ¯, pS
 
= PrS(q
R(+))
 
uˆS(q
R(+))  uˆS(pR)
 
+ (1  PrS(qR(+)))
 
uˆS(q
R( ))  uˆS(pR)
 
.
As uˆS
 
qR
 
is bounded in the simplex   (⇥) , let M be the maximum variation M =
sup uˆS(qR)  inf uˆS(qR). Then
 
 
 , pS
    PrS(qR(+)) uˆS(qR(+))  uˆS(pR) + (1  PrS(qR(+)))
PrS(qR(+))
M
 
.
Let ' = uˆS(qR(+))   uˆS(pR) > 0. As PrS(qR(+)), given by (30), is continuous in pS, and
PrS(qR(+)) converges to 1 as the prior belief pS tends to 1✓0 , where ✓0 satisfies qR✓0(+)/p
R
✓0 =
max✓2⇥ qR✓ (+)/p
R
✓ , we can always find p
0S such thatX
✓2⇥
p0S✓
qR✓ (+)/p
R
✓
max✓2⇥ qR✓ (+)/p
R
✓
>
M
M + '
,
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which implies that  
 
 , p0S
 
> 0, i.e. a sender with prior p0S is so confident of inducing
the favorable belief qR(+) with ⇡
 
 
 
that, regardless of uS, she benefits from information
control. ⌅
The proofs of Propositions 4 and 5 will make use of the following Lemma.
Lemma A.1 Let x, y 2 RN , and W defined by (3). Then,
1
2
   xkW      ykW   + ⌦xkW , ykW ↵  = max hx, vi hy, vi , s.t., v 2 W, kvk = 1. (31)
Proof : For notational convenience, let ⇢(x, y) be the angle formed by the vectors x and y,
where trivially for any v we have ⇢(x, y) = ⇢(x, v)+⇢(v, y). If v 2 W , then hv, xi = ⌦v, xkW ↵
and hv, yi = ⌦v, ykW ↵ . Therefore, for every v 2 W, kvk = 1, we have
hx, vi hy, vi = ⌦v, xkW ↵ ⌦v, ykW ↵ =   xkW      ykW    kvk2 cos ⇢  v, xkW   cos ⇢  v, ykW  
=
  xkW      ykW    cos  ⇢  v, xkW  + ⇢  v, ykW   + cos  ⇢  v, xkW    ⇢  v, ykW   2
=
  xkW      ykW    cos  2⇢  v, xkW  + ⇢  xkW , ykW   + cos  ⇢  xkW , ykW   2 ,
which implies
max
v2W,kvk=1
hx, vi hy, vi
=
  xkW      ykW   "cos  ⇢  xkW , ykW   2 + maxv2W,kvk=1 cos
 
2⇢
 
v, xkW
 
+ ⇢
 
xkW , ykW
  
2
#
=
  xkW      ykW   "cos  ⇢  xkW , ykW   2 + 12
#
,
where the maximum is achieved by selecting a vector v such that ⇢
 
v, xkW
 
=  12⇢
 
xkW , ykW
 
.
Rewriting this last expression one obtains (31). ⌅
Proof of Proposition 4: Part (i). We will first show that if T \A+ 6= ?, then there exists
a signal with two signal realizations such that the sender chooses a strictly higher decision
after either realization. This implies that information control is valuable to the sender, for
any strictly increasing uS and totally mixed pS.
Let qR0 2 T\A+. Since a(qR) is continuous then A+ is open and there is a neighborhood of
qR0 with all posterior beliefs leading to strictly higher decisions. In particular, there exists ⌘¯ >
0 such that qR0   ⌘¯ra(pR)kW 2 A+. Next, define the vector t(⌘¯) =  (qR0   ⌘¯ra(pR)kW  pR).
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We now show that there is a belief of the receiver qR = pR +  t(⌘¯),   > 0, that leads to a
higher action, i.e. such that a
 
pR +  t(⌘¯)
   a  pR  > 0.
Since ra(pR)kW 6= 0, then⌦ra(pR), t(⌘¯)↵ =   ⌦ra(pR), qR0   pR↵+ ⌘¯ ⌦ra(pR),ra(pR)kW ↵
= ⌘¯
⌦ra(pR)kW ,ra(pR)kW ↵ > 0.
This implies that the derivative of the function a( ) = a
 
pR +  t(⌘¯)
 
is strictly positive at
  = 0. Therefore, there exists  ⇤ > 0 such that
a
 
pR +  ⇤t(⌘¯)
   a  pR  > 0.
Consider now a signal with two signal realizations that induce posterior beliefs in the receiver
qR0   ⌘¯ra(pR)kW and pR +  ⇤t( ⌘¯). By construction, these two posterior beliefs lie on the
same line that contains the prior belief pR and thus can be induced by a signal. Importantly,
both posteriors lead to a higher decision for the receiver, and thus information control is
valuable for the sender.
To prove the second part, note that if the restriction of the Hessian matrix H(a(pR)) to
the tangent hyperplane has a positive eigenvalue then the intersection T \A+ is non-empty.
Part (ii). Under pure persuasion, the representation (14) translates to
VR(q
R) = uS(a(q
R))
⌦
qR, rS
↵
. (32)
Our proof strategy is to show that, whenever (17) holds, one can find a direction in the
space W of ”marginal beliefs” along which VR is locally strictly convex at qR = pR. This
implies that V˜R(pR) > VR(pR), and thus information control is valuable.
Consider a vector v 2 W , and the function V ( ; v) = VR(pR +  v). Twice di↵erentiating
(32) and evaluating it at   = 0 we can write
@2V ( ; v)
@ 2
    
 =0
= u00S(a(p
R))
⌦ra(pR), v↵2 + u0S(a(pR))vTH(a(pR))v (33)
+2u0S(a(p
R))
⌦ra(pR), v↵ ⌦v, rS↵ .
Next, let  denote the function
 (v) =
u00S(a(p
R))
u0S(a(pR))
⌦ra(pR), v↵2 + 2 ⌦ra(pR), v↵ ⌦v, rS↵ .
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It can be readily seen that  is a quadratic form satisfying the functional form of Lemma
A.1. Letting m = ra(pR) and n = u00S(a(pR))u0S(a(pR))ra(p
R) + 2rS, Lemma A.1 then implies that
1
2
  mkW      nkW     1 + cos  mkW , nkW    = max (v), s.t., v 2 W, kvk = 1.
Furthermore, if  min is the smallest eigenvalue of H(a(pR)), one has that
 min kvk2  vTH(a(pR))v.
We can now establish the existence of a vector v such that V ( ) = VR(pR +  v) is locally
stricly convex. Indeed, taking into account the definition of  (v), we can rewrite (33) as
d2V
d 2
    
 =0
= u0S(a(p
R))
 
 (v) + vTH(a(pR))v
    u0S(a(pR))   (v) +  min kvk2  .
Condition (17) guarantees that max (v) > | min| and thus the existence of a vector v⇤ 2 W ,
kv⇤k = 1, such that  (v⇤) = max (v) and
@2V ( ; v⇤)
@ 2
    
 =0
  u0S(a(pR))
 
 (v⇤) +  min kv⇤k2
 
> 0,
thus VR(pR) is locally strictly convex in the direction v⇤. ⌅
Proof of Lemma 1: Let " = qR   pR 2 W with qR 2   (⇥). Posterior belief qR does not
decrease the receiver’s action if and only if h", xi   0, while (5) implies that for any signal,
the sender does not assign more probability to the receiver having a belief qR if and only if⌦
", rS
↵  0. Therefore, for any signal and every signal realization, the sender never assigns
more probability to any belief that (weakly) increases the receiver’s action if and only if
h", xi ⌦", rS↵  0 , " = qR   pR, qR 2   (⇥) .
Since the set
 
" : " = qR   pR, qR 2   (⇥) ⇢ W contains a neighborhood of 0 in W , then
the previous condition is satisfied if and only if the following global condition is true:
h", xi ⌦", rS↵  0 for " 2 W,
or, in other words, i↵ the quadratic form h", xi ⌦", rS↵ is negative semidefinite in W .
Consider the orthogonal decompositions x = xkW + ↵x1 and rS = rSkW + ↵r1. Whenever
" 2 W we have h", xi = ⌦", xkW ↵ and ⌦", rS↵ = D", rSkW E , implying that negative semidefi-
niteness of h", xi ⌦", rS↵ in W is equivalent to negative semidefiniteness of ⌦", xkW ↵ D", rSkW E
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in W. From Lemma A.1 we have
0 = max
"2W,k"k=1
⌦
", xkW
↵ ⌦
", rSkW
↵, ⌦xkW , rSkW ↵ =  ||xkW ||||rSkW ||,
If xkW 6= 0 and rSkW 6= 0, then
D
xkW , rSkW
E
=  ||xkW ||||rSkW || i↵ cos
⇣
xkW , rSkW
⌘
=  1
which is equivalent to the existence of ↵ > 0 such that xkW =  ↵rSkW .⌅
Lemma A.2 Suppose that N = card(⇥)   3 and consider the subspaceW =  " 2 RN : h", 1i = 0 
with the derived topology. Then, for v /2 W, the rational function h", wi / h", vi, " 2 W , is
bounded in a neighborhood of 0 if and only if vkW and wkW are collinear.
Proof : Consider the linear subspace Wv,1 =
 
" 2 RN : h", vi = 0, h", 1i = 0 . As, by as-
sumption v /2 W , then Wv,1 is a linear subspace of dimension N   2   1. Consider now
the subspace Ww =
 
" 2 RN : h", wi = 0 . The ratio h", wi / h", vi is locally unbounded in
W i↵ Wv,1 \ W cw 6= ?. First, if the projections vkW and wkW are not collinear then the
orthogonal projection wkWv,1 is non-zero, implying that
⌦
wkWv,1 , v
↵
= 0 but
⌦
wkWv,1 , w
↵
> 0.
This establishes that Wv,1 \W cw 6= ?. Now suppose that vkW =   wkW for some   6= 0.
Then
⌦
", vkW
↵
= 0 i↵
⌦
", wkW
↵
= 0, implying Wv,1 \W cw = ?. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 5: The representation (14) applied to our setup yields
VR(q
R) = uS(
⌦
qR, x
↵
)
⌦
qR, rS
↵
,
with gradient at the prior belief pR
rVR(pR) = u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)x+ uS(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)rS.
Corollary 1 implies that the value of information control is zero if and only if⌦rVR(pR), qR   pR↵   V R(qR)  V R(pR), qR 2   (⇥) ,
which in our case leads to
u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)
⌦
x, qR   pR↵  ⌦qR, rS↵  uS(⌦qR, x↵)  uS(⌦pR, x↵)    0, qR 2   (⇥) . (34)
To ease notation, let " = qR   pR 2 W and define 4 as the left hand side of (34),
4 = u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
) hx, "i   ⌦qR, rS↵  uS(⌦qR, x↵)  uS(⌦pR, x↵)  . (35)
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Part (i) - To show that for an arbitrary smooth and increasing uS the value of information
control is positive whenever xkW and rSkW are not negatively collinear, it su ces to find a
feasible qR such that 4 < 0. First, with the help of the identities
uS(
⌦
qR, x
↵
)  uS(
⌦
pR, x
↵
) =
Z hqR,xi
hpR,xi
u0S(t)dt,
uS(
⌦
qR, x
↵
)  uS(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)  hx, "i u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
) =
Z hqR,xi
hpR,xi
u0S(t)dt 
Z hqR,xi
hpR,xi
u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)dt,
=
Z hqR,xi
hpR,xi
 
u0S(t)  u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)
 
dt,
=
Z hqR,xi
hpR,xi
Z t
hpR,xi
u00S(⌧)d⌧dt,
and
⌦
pR, rS
↵
= 1, we can rewrite 4 in (35) as
4 =  
Z hqR,xi
hpR,xi
Z t
hpR,xi
u00S(⌧)d⌧dt 
⌦
", rS
↵ Z hqR,xi
hpR,xi
u0S(t)dt.
Given qR, The smoothness condition on u00S(a) implies that u
0
S(a) and u
00
S(a) are bounded
in the compact set A =
 
a : a =
⌦
qR, z
↵
, qR 2   (⇥) . Thus, let mS = min {u0S(a) : a 2 A}
and MS = max |u00S(a)| : a 2 A, with mS > 0 since u0S(a) > 0. Then
4  MS
Z hqR,xi
hpR,xi
Z t
hpR,xi
d⌧dt  ⌦", rS↵mS Z hqR,xi
hpR,xi
dt
=
1
2
h", xi2MS  
⌦
", rS
↵ h", ximS
= mS h", xi2
 
1
2
MS
mS
 
⌦
", rS
↵
h", xi
!
.
From Lemma A.1, if xkW and rSkW are not negatively collinear then there exists a neigh-
borhood N(0) of 0 in W such that
⌦
", rS
↵
/ h", xi admits no upper bound in N(0). This
establishes the existence of " 2 N(0), and thus a feasible qR = pR + ", such that
1
2
MS
mS
 
⌦
", rS
↵
h", xi < 0,
implying that 4 < 0.
Part (ii)- We show that if, in addition, uS is concave then the condition on x and rS is
also necessary for the sender to benefit from information control. Our proof strategy is
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to establish the contrapositive: if xkW and rSkW are negatively collinear then the value of
information control is zero.
Concavity of uS yields the following bound
uS(
⌦
qR, x
↵
)  uS(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)  u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
) h", xi ,
which, applied to (35), implies
4    u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
) h", xi ⌦", rS↵ . (36)
As xkW and rSkW are negatively collinear, Lemma 1 implies that
h", xi ⌦", rS↵  0 for " 2 W,
which applied to (36) leads to
4    u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
) h", xi ⌦", rS↵   0 for " 2 W, .
Since 4   0 for all feasible beliefs, Corollary 1 implies that the value of information control
is zero. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 6: Part (i) - First, likelihood ratio orders are preserved by bayesian
updating with commonly understood signals (Whitt 1979, Milgrom 1981). Thus, induced
posteriors satisfy qS(z) ⌫LR qR(z) if pS ⌫LR pR for any signal ⇡ and signal realization z,
and, as x is increasing in ✓, we must then have
⌦
qS(z), x
↵   ⌦qR(z), x↵ . Therefore
qS✓ uS(h1✓, xi)   uS(
⌦
qS, x
↵
)   uS(
⌦
qR, x
↵
) = VS
 
qS
 
, qS 2   (⇥) ,
where the first inequality follows from convexity of uS. Corollary 2 then implies that garbling
is not valuable.
Part (ii) - Consider two states ✓ and ✓0 and the indexed family of receiver’s posterior beliefs
qR( ) and associated sender’s beliefs qS( ) given by
qR( ) =  1✓0 + (1   )1✓,   2 [0, 1],
qS( ) =  ( )1✓0 + (1   ( ))1✓,with  ( ) =  rS✓0/( rS✓0 + (1   )rS✓ ).
Define W ( , ✓, ✓0) as
W ( , ✓, ✓0) =  ( )uS(x (✓0)) + (1   ( ))uS(x (✓0))
 uS( x (✓0) + (1   )x (✓0)).
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From Corollary 2, if for some ( , ✓, ✓0) we have W ( , ✓, ✓0) < 0, then the value of garbling is
positive. After some algebraic manipulations we can express W ( , ✓, ✓0) as
W ( , ✓, ✓0) =
 (1   )
( rS✓0 + (1   )rS✓ )
S( , ✓, ✓0),
with
S( , ✓, ✓0) = rS✓0
1
(1   )
Z x(✓0)
 x(✓0)+(1  )x(✓)
u0S (t) dt  rS✓
1
 
Z  x(✓0)+(1  )x(✓)
x(✓)
u0S (t) dt,
where we have exploited the absolute continuity of uS to express it as the integral of its
derivative. Evaluating S( , ✓, ✓0) at the extremes we obtain
S(0, ✓, ✓0) = (x (✓0)  x (✓))  rS✓0 u¯0S   rS✓ u0S (x (✓))  , (37)
S(1, ✓, ✓0) = (x (✓0)  x (✓))  rS✓0u0S (x (✓0))  rS✓ u¯0S  , (38)
with
u¯0S =
1
(x (✓0)  x (✓))
Z x(✓0)
x(✓)
u0S (t) dt.
By assumption, there exist ✓0 and ✓, ✓0 > ✓, such that
 
rS✓0
 2
u0S (x (✓
0)) <
 
rS✓
 2
u0S (x (✓)).
This implies that
rS
✓0
rS✓
u0S (x (✓
0)) < r
S
✓
rS
✓0
u0S (x (✓)), which implies that either S(0, ✓, ✓
0) or S(1, ✓, ✓0)
is strictly negative. To see this, suppose for example that S(0, ✓, ✓0)   0. Then
rS✓0
rS✓
u0S (x (✓
0))  u¯0S <
rS✓
rS✓0
u0S (x (✓))  u¯0S =  
S(0, ✓, ✓0)
(x (✓0)  x (✓)) rS✓0
 0) S(1, ✓, ✓0) < 0.⌅
Proof of Corollary 3: The claim follows immediately by applying Proposition 5(i) to the
cases where x = ✓ and x =  ✓. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 7: In the text.
Proof of Proposition 8: See Appendix B.
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B On-line Supplemental Material
Lemma B.1 Let R be defined by (26) and m = 12
max|u00S(a)|
minu0S(a)
> 0, and for each rR 2 R define
 S =
hqS ,rRxi
hqS ,rRi  
⌦
pR, x
↵
, and define lrR(") as
lrR(") =
⌦
", rR
↵
 S
. (39)
For any " and rR 2 R such that
lrR(") <  m and  S > 0, with pS + " 2   (⇥) , (40)
there exists a signal ⇡ with the following properties: (i) Some realization of ⇡ induces in
the sender the belief pS + " and (ii) ⇡ increases the expected utility of the sender when the
receiver’s associated likelihood ratio is rR.
Proof : The function lrR(") has an immediate interpretation as a measure of disagreement:
the numerator
⌦
", rR
↵
is the di↵erence in the probability that the receiver and sender attach
to a signal realization inducing a posterior qS = pS + " on the sender, divided by the
probability that the sender ascribes to such signal realization, while the denominator is the
change in the receiver’s action when the sender changes her belief to qS. We first show that
if some " satisfies (40), then the value of information control is positive. Consider VS defined
in (9), which in this case can be written as
VS(q
S) = uS
 ⌦
qS, rRx
↵
hqS, rRi
!
,
with gradient at pS
rVS(pS) = u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)
 
rRx  ⌦pR, x↵ rR  .
By Corollary 1, the value of information control is positive if and only if there exists ", with
pS + " 2   (⇥) , such that ⌦rVS(pS), "↵ < VS(pS + ")  VS(pS). (41)
We now show that an " satisfying (40) also satisfies (41). Since
uS
 ⌦
qS, rRx
↵
hqS, rRi
!
 uS(
⌦
pR, x
↵
) u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)
 ⌦
qS, rRx
↵
hqS, rRi  
⌦
pR, x
↵!
=
Z hqS,rRxi
hqS,rRi
hpR,xi
Z t
hpR,xi
u00S(⌧)d⌧dt,
1
we can rewrite (41) as
u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)
⌦
", rR
↵
 S <
Z hqS,rRxi
hqS,rRi
hpR,xi
Z t
hpR,xi
u00S(⌧)d⌧dt.
By the mean value theorem, we have
Z hqS,rRxi
hqS,rRi
hpR,xi
Z t
hpR,xi
u00S(⌧)d⌧dt    max |u00S(a)|
Z hqS,rRxi
hqS,rRi
hpR,xi
Z t
hpR,xi
d⌧dt =  1
2
max |u00S(a)| 2S.
Moreover, if " satisfies (40) then it also satisfies
⌦
", rR
↵
min u0S(a) <  
1
2
max |u00S(a)| S,
implying that " also satisfies (41) since
u0S(
⌦
pR, x
↵
)
⌦
", rR
↵
 S <
⌦
", rR
↵
 S min u
0
S(a) <  
1
2
max |u00S(a)| 2S 
Z hqS,rRxi
hqS,rRi
hpR,xi
Z t
hpR,xi
u00S(⌧)d⌧dt.
For each " satisfying (40), we now construct a signal that improves the sender’s expected
utility and that has a realization that induces belief pS+" in the sender. Let   be the excess
of the right hand side over the left hand side in (41),
  = VS(p
S + ")  VS(pS) 
⌦rVS(pS), "↵ > 0. (42)
Consider the signal ⇡(",  ) with Z = {"+, " } , such that PrS[z = "+] =   and if z = "+ then
the sender’s posterior is pS + ". A taylor series expansion of VS(qS) yields
VS(q
S) = VS(p
S) +
⌦rVS(pS), qS   pS↵+ L  qS   pS  , with lim
t!0
L
 
t
 
qS   pS  
t
= 0. (43)
Then the sender’s gain from signal ⇡(",  ) is
 ⇡(", ) =  
 
VS(p
S + ")  VS(pS)
 
+ (1   )
✓
VS(p
S    
1    ")  VS(p
S)
◆
=  
 
  +
⌦rVS(pS), "↵     ⌦rVS(pS), "↵+ L✓   
1    "
◆
=  
✓
    (1   ) L (  "/(1   ))
(  /(1   ))
◆
.
The convergence to zero of the second term in the parenthesis when   tends to zero and
  > 0 guarantees the existence of   > 0 such that  ⇡(", ) > 0. ⌅
2
Proof of Proposition 8: First, we introduce additional notation. With lrR(") defined as
in (39), define the sets M(rR) by
M(rR) =
 
" : lrR(") <  m,  S > 0, pS + " 2   (⇥)
 
.
Note that rS and x are negatively collinear if and only if rR and rRx are positively collinear.
That is, the condition on Proposition 5 could be instead stated in terms of collinearity
of rR and rRx. Moreover, if rR and rRx are not collinear then the restriction of lrR(") to
{" : h", 1i = 0} is surjective and thus the set M(rR) is non-empty.
Define the function
 
 
", rR
 
=
⌦
", rR  mfR↵+  ⌦", rR↵ 2 , with fR = rRx  ⌦pS, rRx↵ ,
which characterizesM(rR) since for " such that pS+" 2   (⇥),   ", rR   0 and ⌦", fR↵   0
if and only if " 2M(rR). Finally, let
  = 2
✓
1 +m (max |x✓|+ kxk) + (4 +m kxk) sup
rR2R
  rR  ◆ , (44)
Z = min
"2{":pS+"2 (⇥)},rR2R
 
 
", rR
 
s.t.
⌦
", rR
 
x  ⌦pS, rRx↵ ↵  0, rR 2 R. (45)
Under the conditions of Proposition 8, Z < 0. Finally, define   in (27) as
  =
|Z|
 
. (46)
Our proof is structured in two steps that show (i) if \rR2RM(rR) is non-empty then following
Lemma B.1 allows us to design a signal ⇡ that increases the sender’s expected utility for
every receiver’s belief in the support of h(pR|pS), and (ii) under the conditions of Proposition
8, \rR2RM(rR) 6= ?.
Step (i) - Suppose that " 2 \rR2RM(rR). Consider   as defined by (42). As   is a continuous
function of rR in the compact set R, it achieves a minimum  = minrR2R   > 0. Then, define
  as
  = min
(
  :   +
L
    1  " 
 
  0
)
,
with the function L given by (43). Now define the signal ⇡(",  0) as in the proof of Lemma
B.1, i.e. Z = {"+, " } , qS("+) = pS + " and PrS[z = "+] =  0, and set  0 = . Then the
sender’s gain from ⇡(",  0) is positive for any receiver’s prior in Supp(h(pR|pS)).
3
Step (ii) - Fix pR
0
with associated likelihood ratio rR
0 2 R. For any rR 2 R with ⌘ = rR rR0 ,
we have
 
 
", rR
   ⇣", rR0⌘ = ⇣1 +mDpS, rR0xE+ D", rR + rR0E⌘ h", ⌘i m h", ⌘xi+m ⌦pS, ⌘x↵ h", ri .
The following bounds make use of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality (in particular the im-
plication that |h", ⌘xi|  k"k k⌘k kxk, see Steele 2004 21) and the fact that   pS    1 and
k"k =   qS   pS    2,
   1 +mDpS, rR0xE+ D", rR + rR0E     1 +mmax x✓ + 4 sup
rR2R
  rR   ,
|m h", ⌘xi|  m k"k k⌘k kxk  2m k⌘k kxk ,  m ⌦pS, ⌘x↵ h", ri    2m k⌘k kxk sup
rR2R
  rR   .
From these bounds, we then obtain the following estimate     ", rR   ⇣", rR0⌘        1 +mDpS, rR0xE+ D", rR + rR0E    k"k k⌘k
+ |m h", ⌘xi|+   m ⌦pS, ⌘x↵ h", ri  
 2
✓
1 +mmax x✓ + 4 sup
rR2R
  rR  ◆ k⌘k+ 2m kxk k⌘k
+2m kxk sup
rR2R
  rR   k⌘k
=   k⌘k ,
where   is defined by (44). Selecting "0 an rR0 that solve the program (45) and noting that
Z < 0 we then have that for any rR 2 R,
 
 
"0, rR
 
=  
⇣
"0, rR
0
⌘
+ 
 
"0, rR
   ⇣"0, rR0⌘  Z +   k⌘k  Z + |Z| = 0.
This implies that "0 2M(rR) for all rR 2 R. ⌅
21Steele, J. M. (2004) “The Cauchy-Schwarz Master Class: An Introduction to the Art of Mathematical
Inequalities,” Mathematical Association of America.
4
